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N 1990, a Congressional Federal Courts Committee concluded that
the federal system of tax litigation was an "irrational," "crazy quilt."'
The committee recommended that Congress beautify this quilt by re-
moving tax jurisdiction from the Court of Federal Claims2 and the Fed-
eral Circuit Court of Appeals.3 Congress has not yet adopted this change,
and the debate between tax professionals continues. 4 This paper argues
that Congress should retain the "crazy quilt." The federal system of tax
litigation may not be pretty, but it contains unique checks and balances
that are needed to restrain a necessarily aggressive and powerful Internal
1. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 31 (Apr. 2, 1990), quoted in Martin D. Ginsburg, The Federal
Courts Study Committee on Claims Court Tax Jurisdiction, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 631 (1991).
2. At that time the Court of Federal Claims was known as the Court of Claims. Con-
gress changed its name to the United States Court of Federal Claims on October 29, 1992.
Federal Courts Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506.
3. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 31, 21, 69 (Apr. 2, 1990).
4. See, e.g., James P. Holden, The Federal Courts Study Committee Has Not Made the
Case for its Proposed Overhaul of the Tax Litigation Process, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 639
(1991); Ginsburg, supra note 1 (arguing that congress should adopt the study's recommen-
dations); COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF AP-
PEALS, FINAL REPORT, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 105-119 (Dec. 18, 1998) (suggesting that all
tax appeals could be centralized in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals).
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Revenue Service. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals is a crucial part
of these checks and balances because no court checks an aggressive and
powerful federal agency better than the Federal Circuit.
The following five parts demonstrate this position. Part I diagrams the
current system of federal tax litigation. Part II uses statistical analysis to
argue that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals is not biased against the
government. Part III analyzes specific cases where the Federal Circuit
has checked the IRS. Part IV explains why the Internal Revenue Service
must be aggressive and powerful. Finally, Part V argues that no court
checks the Internal Revenue Service better than the Federal Circuit.
I. FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION ORIGINATES IN THREE
VENUES: DISTRICT COURTS, THE TAX COURT, AND
THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
In general, taxpayers can bring tax disputes in three venues: 1) the
United States Tax Court; 2) the United States Court of Federal Claims;
and 3) federal district court. These venues have different jurisdiction, lo-
cation, and procedures.5
The jurisdiction of these courts is concurrent in some areas, but exclu-
sive in others. The Tax Court has deficiency jurisdiction, but the district
courts and the Court of Federal Claims have refund jurisdiction. In other
words, to gain access to the Tax Court, taxpayers must refuse to pay a tax
deficiency and file an action in the Tax Court.6 Otherwise, the taxpayer
can pay the deficiency up front and file a refund action in either the tax-
payer's home district court or in the Court of Federal Claims. 7 District
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions to quiet title in an estate or
in real property,8 over criminal tax actions,9 and over tax disputes that
arise during bankruptcy actions.' 0 District courts hear cases from one
geographic jurisdiction, but the Court of Federal Claims and the Tax
Court have national jurisdiction. Otherwise these three courts generally
consider the same kinds of tax issues.
All of the Tax Court's cases are tax cases, but the district courts and the
Court of Federal Claims hear a variety of cases. The Court of Federal
Claims generally focuses on money claims against the United States.
About 25% of the Court of Federal Claims' cases are tax refund cases,
33% involve government contracts, and 10% involve the Fifth Amend-
5. For a discussion on choosing which venue to litigate in, see GERALD A. KAFKA &
RITA A. CAVANAUGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX CONTROVERSIES § 1.01 (2002).
6. 26 U.S.C. § 6213 (1988).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f) (1988).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001) grants district courts general federal question jurisdiction:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the




ment's takings clause.'I The court's other cases involve government pay-
roll, Indian tribes, intellectual property, and various other statutory
money claims. 12 The district courts hear the widest variety of cases, in-
cluding civil and criminal cases. In the year 2000, less than 1% of civil
cases filed in the district courts were tax cases. 13
Location is another way these courts differ. The Tax Court is physi-
cally located in Washington, D.C., but its judges ride a circuit and conduct
trials in designated cities across the nation. 14 The Court of Federal
Claims, on the other hand, occasionally conducts parts of its trials around
the nation, but it is based in Washington, D.C. and conducts most trials in
Washington. 15 District courts are spread across the country.
Finally, these courts differ in procedure and appeal. The district courts
offer jury trials, but the Tax Court and the Court of Federal Claims offer
judge trials only. Other procedural rules of the district courts and the
Court of Federal Claims mostly match, but Tax Court procedure is sub-
stantially unique.' 6 After trial, taxpayers appeal cases from the Tax
Court and district courts to one of the regional circuit courts of appeals,
according to the tax dispute's location. Taxpayers appeal Court of Fed-
eral Claims cases exclusively to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
The following parts describe why the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
plays a crucial role in the above system by checking an aggressive and
powerful Internal Revenue Service.
II. A STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT
TAX HOLDINGS WITH FIFTH CIRCUIT TAX
HOLDINGS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS NOT
BIASED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
Opponents of Federal Circuit tax jurisdiction outwardly argue organi-
zation and uniformity as reasons to remove tax jurisdiction from the Fed-
eral Circuit,' 7 but their real motivation appears to be Federal Circuit
11. See U.S. CTi'. FED. CLAIMS, THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FED-
ERAL CLAIMS, at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/uscfchistory.htm (last modified June 4,
2001).
12. Id.
13. JU1ICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR, TABLE C-2, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS-CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, I3Y BASIS
OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF SUr, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEP-
TEMBER 30, 2000, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/appendices/c02sep00.pdf
(last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
14. See Tax Court website, at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov (last updated Sept. 23, 2002).
15. See Court of Federal Claims website, at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov (last visited
Jan. 30, 2002).
16. KAFKA & CAVANAUGH, supra note 5, § 1.01. Because of these different proce-
dures Internal Revenue Service lawyers handle Tax Court cases, and Department of Justice
lawyers handle district court and Court of Federal Claims cases.
17. Ginsburg, supra note 1.
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bias. 18 Some think that the Federal Circuit is so biased against the gov-
ernment, that it cannot be trusted with tax cases. The following statistics
dispute this myth. The Federal Circuit is not generally biased against the
government, but it has acquired a taxpayer-friendly reputation by check-
ing the IRS's power in a few high profile cases.
The following tables demonstrate by comparing Federal Circuit tax
holdings with Fifth Circuit tax holdings from 1997 through 2001. These
tables compare substantive tax cases only. In other words, cases that
turned on procedural and jurisdictional issues are not included. Also, the
tables do not consider unpublished opinions; unpublished opinions gener-
ally involve routine cases that do not indicate a court's substantive posi-
tion. Finally, the tables do not consider cases that turn on issues not
heard by both courts. For example, criminal cases, bankruptcy cases, tort
cases, and international trade cases are not considered.
A. AN ANALYSIS OF GENERAL WINS IN SUBSTANTIVE TAX CASES
INDICATES THAT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT IS NOT GENERALLY
BIASED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
This first table analyzes all substantive tax cases and large corporate
cases. The results show that the Federal Circuit generally holds for the
government more often than does the Fifth Circuit.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
1997-2001 - GENERAL WINS IN SUBSTANTIVE TAX CASES
Federal Circuit Fifth Circuit
Taxpayer Gov't Taxpayer Gov't
All Substantive Tax Holdings* 16 24 16 19
Corporate Cases over $1 Million* 11 10 2 2
All Substantive by Estimated $** 232,930,627 311,684,422 38,479,794 18,694,567
Corp Over $1 million by Estimated $** 230,026,646 257,572,664 12,257,626 10,586,776
*Mixed holdings are not included unless one party benefited significantly more than the other.
**Some dollar amounts are estimated from incomplete opinion information.
In all substantive cases, the Federal Circuit held for taxpayers only
40% of the time, while the Fifth Circuit held for taxpayers 46% of the
time. In large corporate cases, the Federal Circuit held for taxpayers
52% of the time, but it makes sense that corporate taxpayers would suc-
ceed more than all taxpayers. A large corporation generally acts ration-
ally, so it does not bring a case to trial unless it has a legitimate chance of
winning. Other taxpayers may bring suit for emotional reasons.
Federal Circuit case value also stands out. Federal Circuit case value
averages over $13 million, while Fifth Circuit case value averages less
18. This is a commonly held sentiment among tax practitioners that the author con-
firmed by speaking with various professors, government lawyers, private lawyers, and Cer-
tified Public Accountants.
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than $2 million. This value comparison underscores the Federal Circuit's
significant role in tax litigation.
B. AN ANALYSIS OF TAX HOLDINGS INVOLVING THE MOST
LITIGATED ISSUES INDICATES THAT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
IS NOT BIASED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ON
ANY PARTICULAR ISSUE
The next tables analyze the most litigated issues in both the Federal
Circuit and the Fifth Circuit. Again, Federal Circuit bias against the gov-
ernment does not emerge.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT SUBSTANTIVE TAX HOLDINGS
1997-2001 - WINS BY MOST LITIGATED ISSUES
ByNumberofWins* By Estimated $ in Controversy**
Taxpayer Gov't Taxpayer Gov't
Employee Compensation - 6 - 89,770,007
Consolidated Taxation 1 1 6,641,022 1,328,788
Excise Taxes 2 1 3,243,096 415,889
General Income Definition 2 4 83,659,720 212,082,432
*Mixed holdings are not included unless one party benefited significantly more than the other.
**Some dollar amounts are estimated from incomplete opinion information.
The Federal Circuit's most litigated issue, employee compensation,
does not demonstrate bias against the government. In fact, taxpayers
FIFTH CIRCUIT SUBSTANTIVE TAX HOLDINGS
1997-2001 - WINS BY MOST LITIGATED ISSUES
By Number of Wins* By Estimated $ in Controversy**
Taxpayer Gov't Taxpayer Gov't
Estate Tax 8 3 21,513,726 605,866
Personal Injury Damages 3 - 57,706
General Income Definition 3 1 4,511,816 1,725,000
Interest, Penalties, and Fees 2 2 853,236 2,613,776
*Mixed holdings are not included unless one party benefited significantly more than the other.
**Some dollar amounts are estimated from incomplete opinion information.
won none of those cases. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit's most litigated
issue, estate tax, favors taxpayers. Taxpayers won almost 75% of estate
tax cases in the Fifth Circuit.
C. A JUDGE-BY-JUDGE ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT No PARTICULAR
FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGE IS BIASED AGAINST
THE GOVERNMENT
The next tables analyze tax holdings by Federal and Fifth Circuit judges
that wrote at least three tax case opinions. Like the above tables, these
2003] CHECKING THE BEAST
results do not indicate any particular Federal Circuit bias against the
government.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT SUBSTANTIVE TAX HOLDINGS
1997-2001 - WINS BY MOST ACTIVE JUDGES
By Number of Wins* By Estimated $ in Controversy**
Taxpayer Gov't Taxpayer Gov't
Glenn Leroy Archer, Jr. 2 1 4,655,540 2,835,112
Daniel M. Friedman 2 2 34,981,630 1,996,151
Alan D. Lourie 2 1 63,920,016 60,000
Haldane Robert Mayer 1 3 6,641,022 15,602,658
Paul R. Michel 2 1 35,343,007 10,779
S. Jay Plager 3 1 2,663,341 652,424
Randall R. Rader 1 3 82,488,259 53,127,344
Alvin A. Schall - 5 - 2,513,291
*Mixed Holdings are not included unless one party benefited significantly more than the other
**Some dollar amounts are estimated from incomplete opinion information
If any Federal Circuit judge is biased for or against the government,
one may be biased for the government; Judge Schall has decided five
cases for the government and zero against.
FIFTH CIRCUIT SUBSTANTIVE TAX HOLDINGS
1997-2001 - WINS BY MOST ACTIVE JUDGES
By Number of Wins* By Estimated $ in Controversy**
Taxpayer Gov't Taxpayer Gov't
Reynaldo G. Garza - 2 - 448,585
Patrick E. Higginbotham 2 2 9,705,756 89,036
E. Grady Jolly 2 1 12,646,728 157,281
Edith H. Jones 4 - 8,397,596 -
Jerry E. Smith 2 1 1,769,946 33,343
Jacques L. Wiener, Jr. 2 2 3,419,399 1,726,710
*Mixed holdings are not included unless one party benefited significantly more than the other.
**Some dollar amounts are estimated from incomplete opinion information.
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit may have one judge, if any, that is
biased for taxpayers; Judge Jones decided four cases for taxpayers and
zero for the government.
The above tables demonstrate that the Federal Circuit is not generally
biased against the government. The next sections analyze why the Fed-
eral Circuit has acquired its taxpayer-friendly reputation, and why the
Federal Circuit plays a crucial role in the federal tax system.
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III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S TAXPAYER-FRIENDLY
REPUTATION COMES FROM HIGH PROFILE CASES
WHERE IT HAS CHECKED THE IRS
If the Federal Circuit is not generally biased against the government,
how did it acquire it's taxpayer-friendly reputation? Its reputation comes
from high profile cases where it has restrained the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice. This checking arises when the Federal Circuit decides how much
deference to give IRS regulations and determinations. The Supreme
Court has established general rules governing how much deference courts
should give agency determinations, but the Federal Circuit does not apply
these rules when their application would promote injustice. The next
parts demonstrate by explaining when the Supreme Court defers to fed-
eral agencies, and by analyzing high profile cases where the Federal Cir-
cuit has checked the IRS.
A. THE SUPREME COURT GENERALLY GIVES AGENCY
DETERMINATIONS CONTROLLING OR CONSIDERABLE
WEIGHT, DEPENDING ON THE TYPE
OF DETERMINATION
The Supreme Court has held that deference to regulations depends on
whether the regulation is legislative or interpretive. 19 Agencies issue leg-
islative regulations under a specific grant of authority. In other words,
Congress explicitly states in a particular statute that a federal agency shall
make regulations necessary to implement the statue. The Supreme Court
grants these regulations "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or manifestly contrary" to the governing statute.20 Interpretive
regulations, on the other hand, are issued under general interpretive au-
thority. For example, I.R.C. § 7805 grants the IRS the general power to
implement regulations that interpret the federal tax code. The Supreme
Court grants these regulations "considerable weight," and has held that
"a court may not substitute its own construction.. .for a reasonable inter-
pretation made by the administrator of an agency. '21
The weight given to other agency determinations varies. The Supreme
Court considers a particular determination for "the thoroughness evident
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with ear-
lier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power
to persuade .... "22 The Court has "long recognized that considerable
weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a
statutory scheme....




22. United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2172 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
23. Id. at 2171 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
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The next three cases demonstrate that the Federal Circuit will not ap-
ply the above general rules if their application would bring injustice.
B. RITE AID CORP. V. UNITED STATES-The Federal Circuit Checks
the IRS's Power to Govern Consolidated Taxation
In Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit refused to defer
to a controversial consolidated return regulation. 24 The court invalidated
the long-criticized loss disallowance rule in Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20. That
rule limits the loss that consolidated corporate parents can recognize
from the sale of their subsidiary stock. Critics of the rule argue that it is
invalid because it creates a new tax without Congressional approval. The
Federal Circuit agreed with this criticism and concluded that loss disal-
lowance rule is "manifestly contrary" to I.R.C. § 1502.25 The following
demonstrates that the Supreme Court's general deference rules required
the Federal Circuit to defer to the loss disallowance rule, but the Federal
Circuit decided that those rules would not serve justice.
Rite Aid Corp. v. United States revolved around Rite Aid's sale of its
consolidated subsidiary Penn Encore. In 1984 and 1988, Rite Aid pur-
chased all of Encore's stock for $4,659,730.26 After this purchase, Encore
was only marginally profitable, and in the final three years before 1994,
Encore's net income decreased from a $1.7 million profit to a $5.2 million
loss. 27 Because of this loss, Rite Aid decided to sell Encore in 1994 to an
unrelated company named CMI Holding Corporation for $18 million in
cash and additional CMI stock warrants.28 Rite Aid wanted to treat the
sale as an I.R.C. § 338(h)(10) asset sale, but it agreed to a stock sale after
CMI insisted.29 At the time of sale, Rite Aid's basis in Encore stock had
increased to $38,644,400 because Rite Aid had contributed $44,890,476 to
Encore's capital, and Encore had accumulated $10,905,806 in negative
earnings and profits.30 In accordance with I.R.C. § 1001, Rite Aid sub-
tracted this basis from the selling price and calculated a $22,136,739
loss.31
The controversy arose because Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20(c) disallowed
this entire loss. The loss disallowance rule in Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20(c)
prohibits consolidated corporations from recognizing loss on the sale of
their subsidiary stock to the extent of a duplicative loss factor.32 For this
case's purposes, the duplicative loss factor equals the subsidiary's ad-
justed basis in its assets minus the fair market value of the subsidiary's
24. Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
25. Id. at 1360.
26. Id. at 1358.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Rite Aid Corp., 255 F.3d at 1358.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20 (1991).
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stock at the time of sale.33 Encore's factor equaled $28,535,858, so all of
Rite Aid's $22,136,739 loss was disallowed. 34
Rite Aid paid its 1994 tax without recognizing the Encore loss and then
filed a claim for refund. The Internal Revenue Service denied this claim,
so Rite Aid filed a complaint with the United States Court of Federal
Claims. The Court of Federal Claims granted the government's motion
for summary judgment, 35 and Rite Aid appealed to the Federal Circuit.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered one issue: whether Treas.
Reg. § 1.1502-20 validly implements the legislative authority granted in
I.R.C. § 1502.36 Section 1502 grants the Secretary of the Treasury the
authority to "prescribe such regulations.. .in order that the tax liability of
any affiliated group of corporations making a consolidated return and of
each corporation in the group... may be [determined] in such manner as
clearly to reflect the income-tax liability... and in order to prevent avoid-
ance of such tax liability.' '37 Rite Aid argued that the loss disallowance
rule in Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20 oversteps § 1502 because, instead of help-
ing measure an already existing tax, the loss disallowance rule creates a
new tax.3
8
The Federal Circuit agreed with Rite Aid and invalidated the loss disal-
lowance rule.39 The court stated that I.R.C. § 1502 "does not authorize
the Secretary to choose a method that imposes a tax on income that
would not otherwise be taxed."'40 The loss disallowance rule imposes this
new tax, concluded the court, because it unilaterally excepts I.R.C.
§ 165. 41 Section 165 generally allows a parent corporation to deduct
losses from the sale of subsidiary stock. 42 But the loss disallowance rule
excepts § 165 by taking these losses away from parents that file consoli-
dated returns.43 According to the court, this loss restriction might be
valid if filing consolidated returns caused these losses, but these losses
occur "regardless of whether corporations file separate or consolidated
returns. '44 Because I.R.C. § 1502 allows the Treasury to address only
problems that arise from consolidated taxation, the court concluded that
the loss disallowance rule oversteps the authority granted in § 1502.45
Before analyzing the court's argument, one must consider the broad
power that Congress granted the IRS to implement consolidated return
regulations. The Supreme Court generally grants these kinds of legisla-
33. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20(c) (1991); Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 46 Fed. CI.
500, 503 (2000).
34. Rite Aid Corp., 255 F.3d at 1358.
35. Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 46 Fed. CI. 500 (2000).
36. Rite Aid Corp., 255 F.3d at 1358.
37. I.R.C. § 1502 (2001).
38. Rite Aid Corp., 255 F.3d at 1360.
39. Id. at 1360.
40. Id. at 1359 (quoting Am. Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 261 (1979)).
41. Id. at 1360.
42. I.R.C. § 165 (2001); Rite Aid Corp., 255 F.3d at 1360.
43. Rite Aid Corp., 255 F.3d at 1360.




tive regulations "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute [granting power]. '46 This grant of
power increases the possibility of IRS abuse, but consolidated taxation is
an extremely complicated concept that Congress is not equipped to han-
dle. The IRS is the only government agency that can competently imple-
ment consolidated taxation, so Congress had no choice. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court's general deference rules do not allow courts to check this
broad authority. The next paragraphs demonstrate why Supreme Court
rules generally require courts to defer to the loss disallowance rule by
considering the inherent nature of consolidated taxation and the reasons
why the IRS implemented the loss disallowance rule.
The IRS implemented the loss disallowance rule to solve a consoli-
dated taxation problem that allows parent corporations to sell subsidiary
built-in gain assets-assets with a higher fair market value than adjusted
basis-without recognizing gain. For example, 47 suppose parent corpora-
tion P purchased the stock of subsidiary corporation S for $400 and
elected to file a consolidated return with S. S has two assets with $100 of
built-in gain each: Asset #1 with a $100 basis and a $200 market value,
and Asset #2 with a $100 basis and a $200 market value. If S sells Asset
#1, P's consolidated group would recognize $100 of gain. In addition,
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32 allows P to increase its basis in S stock by $100 to
a total basis of $500. Regulations allow this increase in stock basis, "so
that income or loss previously included in a group's consolidated taxable
income is not reflected a second time on the sale of a subsidiary's
stock."' 48 But in the above situation, where S's income relates to built-in
gain, this basis increase allows P's consolidated group to permanently
avoid all taxation on the Asset #1 sale. For example, if P now sells all of
its S stock, it recognizes an artificially created $100 loss49 that offsets the
$100 gain that S recognized on the Asset #1 sale. This result directly con-
flicts with I.R.C. § 336 and § 337, which require corporations to recognize
gain when they distribute or sell corporate property.50 To take advantage
of this conflict, many corporations created abusive tax-shelter schemes
with labels like "son of mirror."'5
To solve this problem, the IRS considered many complicated solu-
tions.5 2 Theoretically, the most accurate solution is tracing. Tracing in-
volves tracking a subsidiary's built-in gain and not allowing the parent to
46. Id. at 1359 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
47. This example is based on example 2 in Consolidated Return Regulations, 55 Fed.
Reg. 9426-01, 9427 (Temp. Reg. announced Mar. 14, 1990).
48. I.R.S. Notice 87-14, 1987-1 C.B. 445.
49. $400 price minus $500 basis equals $100 loss.
50. See I.R.C. §§ 336, 337 (2001). These code sections repealed Gen. Utils. & Operat-
ing Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
51. For a detailed explanation of "son of mirror" transactions see BoRis I. BITFKER &
JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
§ 13.4215][c] (2001).
52. For a detailed analysis of all of these solutions and their drawbacks see Consoli-




increase its subsidiary stock basis for any earnings or gain related to that
built-in gain. Built-in gain changes as an asset's value changes, so tracing
requires constant appraisal.53 These appraisals are not only incredibly
burdensome, they can be very imprecise and inconsistent.54 The IRS con-
cluded that "Itiracing becomes more subjective the deeper you go into
it."' 55 Accordingly, tracing was rejected.
After considering other combinations of tracing and presumption 56, the
IRS decided on the loss disallowance rule.57 The other options were as
administratively burdensome and imprecise as tracing. 58 Treasury admit-
ted that the loss disallowance rule was imperfect because it not only disal-
lowed losses related to built-in gain, it disallowed economic losses. 59 Rite
Aid's loss, for example, related to Encore's decline in economic value.
Nevertheless, Treasury's other options, like tracing, had other problems
and burdens. In the end, Treasury chose the loss disallowance rule be-
cause it saved IRS resources, and it produced a predicable result.60
Taxpayers may disagree with Treasury's decision, but mere disagree-
ment with a carefully-weighed solution to a complex problem does not
usually overturn a legislative regulation. The Supreme Court has made it
clear that if a "choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflict-
ing policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, [the
Court] should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legis-
lative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would
have sanctioned."' 6' Congress has never objected to the loss disallowance
rule since the IRS implemented it in 1990.62 In fact, Congress considered
53. Lee A. Sheppard, Government Defends Loss Disallowance Rules, 90 TAx NOTES
TODAY 64-10 (1990). During discussions with the IRS, a taxpayer representative argued
that financial accountants appraise assets only upon purchase. But the IRS responded
"that financial accounting focused on the income of the purchaser, while the government
was interested in implementing Notice 87-14, 1987-1 C.B. 445, which requires that fluctua-
tions in asset value be addressed." Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. For example, the Treasury considered disallowing all losses from subsidiary asset
sales, but allowing taxpayers to prove otherwise through tracing. This method was rejected
because "taxpayers, in order to take advantage of the rule, would be forced to resort to
tracing, with all of its attendance complexity and administrative burdens for both taxpayers
and the Service." Consolidated Return Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426-01, 9429 (Temp.
Reg. announced Mar. 14, 1990).
57. See Consolidated Return Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426-01, 9428-9429 (Temp.
Reg. announced Mar. 14, 1990).
58. Id.
59. At a Federal Bar Association meeting in 1990, IRS representatives admitted that
the disallowance of economic loss was the "rough cut" under the loss disallowance model.
Sheppard, supra note 53. But the IRS representatives reiterated that there are "different
rough cuts under other models." Id.
60. See Consolidated Return Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426-01 (Temp. Reg. an-
nounced Mar. 14, 1990).
61. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382(1961)).
62. See Consolidated Return Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426-01, 9428-9429 (Temp.
Reg. announced Mar. 14, 1990).
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legislation that would repeal Rite Aid.63 Congress delegated broad con-
solidated rule making authority to the IRS,6 4 and the IRS's decision in
favor of administrative convenience is generally within that authority.
In addition to the built-in gain problem, the inherent nature of consoli-
dated taxation indicates that the loss disallowance rule is generally within
the IRS's consolidated rulemaking authority. The Federal Circuit's opin-
ion reasoned that the loss disallowance rule creates tax because it forbids
consolidated parents from deducting a loss that I.R.C. § 165 allows sepa-
rate parents to deduct. 65 This reasoning indicates a possible taxpayer in-
justice, but it does not indicate that the loss-disallowance rule exceeds the
IRS's general consolidated rulemaking authority. The court's reasoning
fails to recognize "that the consolidated return regulations adopt a com-
prehensive approach to gain and loss duplication that represents a funda-
mental departure from separate return treatment. '66 Unlike separate
taxation, the IRS's scheme of consolidated taxation treats Rite Aid and
Encore as one corporation for taxation purposes.6 7 Accordingly, the loss
disallowance rule furthers the clear measurement of the IRS's definition
of consolidated income; it prohibits one corporation from recognizing the
same loss twice-once when Rite Aid sells Encore and once when En-
core later sells its assets. 68 I.R.C. § 165 allows both a separate parent and
separate subsidiary to recognize this loss, but the IRS did not treat En-
core and Rite Aid as separate corporations. In short, comparing the
IRS's definition of consolidated taxation to separate taxation is like com-
paring apples to oranges.
Rite Aid's consent is a final reason that the loss disallowance rule is
generally within the IRS's consolidated rule making authority. I.R.C.
§ 1501 states that consolidated treatment is a privilege that corporations
may take advantage of only if they "consent to all the consolidated return
regulations prescribed under section 1502."69 Therefore, Rite Aid con-
sented to the loss disallowance rule when it decided to file a consolidated
return. Rite Aid obviously decided that consolidated taxation's advan-
tages outweighed its disadvantages. As the government stated in its Fed-
eral Circuit brief, Rite Aid agreed to all of the consolidated return
regulations and "must take the bitter with the sweet."' 70
63. See Kenneth J. Kies, Kies Opposes Overturning Rite Aid, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY
169-23 (2001). Granted, "the view of a later Congress cannot control the interpretation of
an earlier enacted statute." O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 90 (1996). But it does
give insight into what a prior Congress might have intended.
64. See I.R.C. § 1502 (2001).
65. Rite Aid Corp., 255 F.3d at 1360.
66. Consolidated Return Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426-01, 9429 (Temp. Reg. an-
nounced Mar. 14, 1990).
67. Textron, Inc. v. Comm'r, 117 T.C. 7 (2001) ("'The basic concept underlying... [the
consolidated return] provisions is that the consolidated group is ... a single taxable enter-
prise .... ' (quoting 3 BITTKER & LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFrs, 90.5 at 90-48 (2d ed. 1991))).
68. Rite Aid Corp., 46 Fed. Cl. at 506.
69. I.R.C. § 1501 (2001).
70. Rite Aid Corp., 255 F.3d at 1360.
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Despite the IRS's broad power to govern consolidated taxation, the
Federal Circuit decided not to defer. The IRS's legislative power to gov-
ern consolidated taxation is unusually broad, so the Supreme Court's gen-
eral deference rules are not appropriate. Congress gave the IRS the
complete power to determine and collect consolidated taxes on only one
condition: the IRS's rules must be determined and applied "in such man-
ner as clearly to reflect" consolidated income. 7' This is a massive amount
of power to give an unelected group that aggressively collects taxes, but
Congress had no choice; the IRS is the only government entity with the
expertise needed to implement consolidated taxation. Furthermore,
Congress does not have enough time to implement such a complicated
system. But this grant of power is dangerous because the IRS is also
designed to aggressively collect taxes. This combination of power and
aggression could lead to abuse if it is not carefully checked. The Federal
Circuit decided that this extraordinary grant of power should not receive
the Supreme Court's general deference.
After deciding that the consolidated loss disallowance rule should re-
ceive a lower amount of deference, the Federal Circuit determined that
the loss disallowance rule promotes injustice. The loss disallowance rule
drastically changed the definition of income. Billions of dollars ride on
the ability of corporate parents to recognize economic loss on the sale of
subsidiary stock. A rule that hurts taxpayers so drastically should be de-
termined by Congress, not the IRS.
One could argue that Congress approves of the loss disallowance rule
because it considered legislation that would repeal Rite Aid.72 But Con-
gress's approval does not mean that the IRS should make such drastic
decisions. Congress may not agree with the next IRS decision. If Con-
gress was not currently faced with budget deficits, it may not have ap-
proved of the loss disallowance rule; Rite Aid could cost the Treasury as
much as $10 billion in tax revenue after other corporations file for re-
fund.73 In short, the Federal Circuit decided that taxpayers should not be
charged billions of dollars without Congressional approval.
C. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP. V. UNITED STATES: THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT REFUSES TO DEFER TO THE IRS's NARROW
DEFINITION OF FUNDED RESEARCH
In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit re-
strained the IRS from interpreting tax statutes too narrowly.74 The IRS's
interpretation was not unreasonable, but it was very aggressive, and the
Federal Circuit decided that deferring to the IRS's judgment would not
serve justice.
71. I.R.C. § 1502 (2001).
72. See Kies, supra note 63.
73. Id.
74. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 210 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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Lockheed revolved around over 300 contracts that Lockheed entered
into with government and private entities. Lockheed and the United
States agreed to limit the trial's contract interpretation to four major
projects: LANTIRN; SICBM; SLAT; and Titan IV.75 The LANTIRN
project developed technology that would permit precision bomb delivery
and nighttime aircraft operation.76 SICBM attempted to develop a small,
mobile, and inexpensive unit designed to launch nuclear warheads, but
the government terminated SICBM before completion. 77 SLAT at-
tempted to develop a reusable ship-to-ship missile that reached super-
sonic speeds at low altitude. 78 The Navy intended to use these missiles to
practice anti-missile defense, but the government decided not to buy pro-
duction units.79 Titan IV developed a space launch vehicle for placing
satellites into orbit.80
Because it incurred research expenses while performing these con-
tracts, Lockheed claimed $63,745,727 in qualified research expenditure
(ORE) tax credits. The Internal Revenue Service denied this claim be-
cause it concluded that the government funded Lockheed's research. 81
Lockheed then filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims.
The Court of Federal Claims agreed with the IRS, and granted the gov-
ernment's motion for summary judgment.82 Lockheed then appealed to
the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit held that Lockheed's research
was not fully funded, and Lockheed was entitled to deduct research
credits.
Two statutes governed Lockheed's claimed ORE credits-I.R.C. § 44F
for credits earned before 1988, and I.R.C. § 41 for credits earned during
and after 1988 83-but the relevant language in each section matches.
Both of these sections allowed ORE credits for expenses related to "qual-
ified research" only,84 and each explicitly excluded from qualified re-
search any research "funded by any grant, contract, or otherwise by any
other person (or any governmental entity)." 85 Lockheed's ability to
claim ORE credits turned on the definition of "funded."
The code sections cited by Lockheed did not define "funded," but
Treas. Reg. § 1.41-5(d) did. This regulation focuses on whether the tax-
payer retains substantial rights in its research results. Research is fully
funded if the taxpayer "retains no substantial rights in research under the
75. Sixty-five percent of the expenses claimed by Lockheed were incurred in these
four contracts. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 485, 487 (1998).
76. Lockheed, 42 Fed. CI. at 487.




81. Id. at 487.
82. Id. at 500.
83. All references to § 44F are to the 1982 I.R.C.; all references to § 41 are to the 1988
I.R.C.
84. I.R.C. § 44F(a) (1982); I.R.C. § 41(a) (1988).
85. I.R.C. § 44F(d) (1982); I.R.C. § 41(d) (1988).
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agreement providing for the research. '86 For example, the regulation
states that a taxpayer does not retain substantial rights if the taxpayer
"must pay for the right to use the results of the research, '87 or if the
taxpayer "confers on another person the exclusive right to exploit the
results of the research."88
Accordingly, the regulations completely disqualify research credits if
the taxpayer does not retain substantial rights in its research, but they
only partially disqualify if the taxpayer does retain substantial rights.8 9 If
the taxpayer retains substantial rights, it may claim the partially qualified
expenditures to the extent another party does not pay them. In other
words, a taxpayer that performs research to satisfy a contract may claim
research expenditures to the extent they exceed the contract price.
Lockheed and the government agreed that Lockheed's contracts give
Lockheed some rights to its research, but they disagreed about the sub-
stantiality of Lockheed's rights. Lockheed's contracts all have substan-
tially similar provisions. These provisions generally gave the government
unlimited rights to the technical data and computer software generated
from the contract's performance. The government could, without Lock-
heed's consent, "use, duplicate, or disclose technical data or computer
software in whole or in part, in any manner and for any purpose whatso-
ever, and to have or permit others to do so."90 Lockheed, on the other
hand, was generally required to reimburse the government if Lockheed
sold any "products, technology, material, services, and/or development or
production techniques" created through contract performance. 91 Lock-
heed had to "reimburse the U.S. Government for a fair share of U.S.
Government expenditures for nonrecurring costs applicable to the items
to be sold."'92 In addition, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
required Lockheed to seek State Department approval before entering
into "any kind of licensing agreement, technology transfer, or technical
assistance agreement; before exporting any hardware to a foreign entity;
or before it could even discuss any technical information not in the public
domain." 93
Lockheed claimed that, regardless of the above limitations, it had sub-
stantial rights to its research because it "retained the right to use the re-
search results in its business." The Federal Circuit agreed. 94 The court
stressed that the right "to use the research results, even without the exclu-
sive right, is a substantial right."'95
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-5(d).
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-5(d)(3).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-5(d)(2).
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-5(d)(3).
90. Lockheed, 42 Fed. Cl. at 490.
91. Id. at 492-93.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 492 (citing Int'l Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30).
94. Lockheed, 210 F.3d at 1372.
95. Id. at 1375.
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The Federal Circuit's opinion does not specifically criticize the research
credit regulations, but the Court implicitly seems to disapprove of their
hyper-technical definitions. These regulations attached technical mean-
ings to common statutory terms. The research credit statutes allow a
credit for research expenses that are not "funded. '96 The statute does
not define "funded," but a common sense reading indicates that a tax-
payer cannot claim a credit for expenses that another entity pays. Lock-
heed admitted that the government contract paid for some of its research,
but the contract did not pay for it all. Lockheed merely tried to claim a
credit for the research expenses it had to pay above and beyond the con-
tract price. Nevertheless, the IRS developed technical regulations that
severely restricted the meaning of "funded." According to these regula-
tions, being funded had more to do with "substantial rights" than
funding.97
But even under the IRS's hyper-technical definition, Lockheed still ap-
peared to qualify for research credits. These regulations required the tax-
payer to retain "substantial rights" in the research results. 98 Under the
plain meaning of substantial, the right to use research without permission
qualifies as substantial. But the IRS decided to attach a hyper-technical
meaning to substantial and determined that the right to use was not
substantial.
D. HATTER V. UNITED STATES: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT PROTECTS
THE JUDICIARY'S INDEPENDENCE
Hatter v. United States99 demonstrates the Federal Circuit's vigorous
defense of constitutional principals. When taxation affects constitutional
principals, the Federal Circuit tends to show even less deference toward
the IRS than it usually does.
Hatter revolved around Congress's ability to withhold Social Security
tax from the salaries of Article III judges. Until 1983, Article III judges
did not participate in Social Security.100 But in 1983, Congress ordered
federal courts to start withholding Social Security tax from Article III
judges' salaries. 1° 1 Sixteen federal judges that were appointed before
1983 challenged this withholding as violating the Compensation Clause in
96. I.R.C. § 44F(d) (1982); I.R.C. § 41(d) (1988).
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-5(d).
98. Id.
99. Hatter v. United States, 64 F.3d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
100. Hatter, 64 F.3d at 648. Most federal employees, including Article III judges, partic-
ipated in the Civil Service Retirement System and did not need social security. Id.
101. Id. Hospital insurance withholding began on January 1, 1983. Tax Equity and Fis-
cal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 278(a), 96 Stat. 324, 559, 562 (codified
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(u) (1988)). Old Age and Survivors Disability insurance
withholdings began on January 1, 1984. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No.
98-21, § 101(a)(1), (b)(1), (d), 97 Stat. 65, 67-70 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.




Article 111.102 This clause states that an Article III judge's compensation
"shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.' 10 3 The six-
teen federal judges argued that withholding social security violated the
Compensation Clause because it "diminished" their salaries.
These judges brought a refund suit in the Court of Claims, 1°4 but the
court dismissed. 10 5 The judges appealed to the Federal Circuit, and the
Federal Circuit reversed and remanded.' 0 6 On remand, the Court of Fed-
eral Claims granted the government's motion for summary judgment,107
and the judges again appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit
reversed the Court of Federal Claims and held that withholding social
security from the judges' salaries violated the Compensation Clause.
The Federal Circuit began its discussion by quoting the Supreme
Court's endorsement of an independent judiciary: "A Judiciary free from
control by the Executive and Legislature is essential if there is a right to
have claims decided by judges who are free from potential domination by
other branches of government."' 0 8 Compensation, the Federal Circuit ar-
gued, greatly affects that independence, so "the Constitution's language
broadly prohibits any diminution in judicial compensation during a
judge's continuance in office." 10 9
Next, the court explained that the Supreme Court had already held
that the Compensation Clause prohibits using taxation to diminish an Ar-
ticle III judge's salary.' 10 In Evans v. Gore, the Supreme Court held that
the Compensation Clause's broad words prohibited all diminution of an
Article III judge's salary:
The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words and appears
to be directed against all diminution, whether for one purpose or
another; and the reasons for its adoption . . . make with impelling
force for the conclusion that the fathers of the Constitution intended
to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as otherwise,-that they
regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater importance
than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.III
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Social Security tax
violated the Compensation Clause."12
The Federal Circuit further supported its analysis by quoting the Con-
stitution's framers. Alexander Hamilton stated that the term "dimin-
ished" prohibits any action that changes the "condition of the individual
102. Hatter, 64 F.3d at 649.
103. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
104. At that time the United States Court of Federal Claims was named the Court of
Claims.
105. United States v. Hatter, 21 CI. Ct. 786 (1990).
106. Hatter v. United States, 953 F.2d 626 (1992).
107. Hatter v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 786 (1994).
108. Hatter, 64 F.3d at 649 (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980)).
109. Id. at 649.
110. Id.
.11. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 255 (1920).
112. Hatter, 64 F.3d at 650.
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[judge] for the worse." 113 James Madison determined that the term
"compensation" applied to all "emoluments" of the judicial office. 114
The government argued that O'Malley v. Woodrough 15 overruled Ev-
ans, but the Federal Circuit disagreed. O'Malley held that newly ap-
pointed Article III judges must continue to pay income taxes after
appointment:
To subject them to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges
are also citizens, and that their particular function in government
does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citi-
zens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and
laws they are charged with administering.' 16
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit pointed out that the judges in O'Malley
took office after Congress had applied income tax to judicial salaries.11 7
Thus, the judges in that case "suffered no diminishment in compensation
after taking office."'1 8 But the judges in Hatter did because they were
"already judges when the Social Security taxes took effect."' 1 9
The Federal Circuit finally held that Social Security benefits were spec-
ulative and did not offset the social security tax.' 20 If Social Security
taxes were vested in an account for each judge, then Social Security's
benefits would offset the Social Security tax.1 21 But social security taxes
were not "vested in any manner," so any benefits from Social Security
were "entirely speculative"122-recent raiding of the Social Security trust
fund supports this position. The Federal Circuit refused to offset Social
Security's "concrete present reduction" with a "speculative, incalculable
future benefit.' 23 The court therefore refunded the entire amount of
Social Security tax withheld from the judges' salaries. 124
One can argue against the Federal Circuit's Hatter decision. 25 It seems
reasonable to assume that Social Security's benefits equal Social Secur-
ity's costs, so the Social Security tax did not diminish the judges' compen-
sation. But Hatter demonstrates the Federal Circuit's aggressive defense
113. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, 473 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
as quoted in Hatter, 64 F.3d at 651.
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
115. O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939).
116. Id. at 282.
117. Hatter, 64 F.3d at 650.
118. Id. at 650.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 652.
121. Id.
122. Hatter, 64 F.3d at 652.
123. Id. at 652.
124. Id. at 653.
125. The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's holding regarding Social Secur-
ity, but on different grounds. Hatter v. United States, 532 U.S. 557 (2001). The Court
overruled Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) "insofar as it holds that the Compensation
Clause forbids Congress to apply a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory tax to the sala-
ries of federal judges." Hatter, 253 U.S. at 567. But the 1983 Social Security statute dis-
criminated against then-sitting judges, so the Court held that it violated the Compensation
Clause. Id. at 572-78.
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of constitutional ideals. It would rather err for the Constitution than
against it.
The next section explains why the Federal Circuit sometimes feels com-
pelled to restrain the IRS.
IV. THE IRS IS AN AGGRESSIVE AND POWERFUL BEAST
THAT MUST BE CHECKED
The Internal Revenue Service is a beast by necessity and design. The
federal tax system is the largest and most complicated debt collection sys-
tem in the world, and administering it requires expertise and an aggres-
sive nature. Congress does not have the expertise, and it does not want
to antagonize the people that elect it, so it gives the IRS an unusually
large amount of power.
Part A explains the IRS's aggression, Part B explains the IRS's power,
and Part C explains why the IRS must be checked.
A. ADMINISTERING THE WORLD'S LARGEST DEBT COLLECTION
SYSTEM REQUIRES AGGRESSION
Aggressiveness is inherent in any effective debt collection system. Be-
cause of this aggression, businesses usually outsource debt collection.
Businesses fear that debt collection could hurt their public image. Debt
collectors must irritate debtors with frequent letters and phone calls, they
must threaten to inform credit agencies, and they must threaten to seize
collateral. 126 If this non-judicial leveraging does not work, then the col-
lector must bring suit, seize property, and garnish wages. 127 These activi-
ties are unpleasant, and they could harm customer relations. Congress
recognized this phenomenon in the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 128
That act protects consumers from overly aggressive debt collectors, but its
debt collection provisions do not apply to businesses that collect their
own debts. 2 9
As hard as collecting is for businesses, it is even harder for the IRS. In
the year 2000, the IRS collected over $2 trillion. 30 The most recent
figures indicate that the gap between taxes owed and taxes collected is
126. For an excellent discussion of non-judicial collection methods, see ELIZABETH
WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORs 45-157
(4th ed. 2001).
127. For an excellent discussion of state law debt collection methods, see id. at 45-157.
128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2001).
129. 15 U.S.C § 1692a(6) (2001) (defining "debt collector" as "any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose
of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect,
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another" (emphasis
added)).
130. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ANNUAL REPORT, STATEMENT OF CUSTODIAL Ac-
TIVITY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPITEMBER 30, 2000, available at http://www.irs.gov
(Forms and Publications, Publication 3385) (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
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$125 billion and growing. 13 Fighting that gap and collecting that tax is a
large job that the IRS has to perform with comparatively small resources.
To make things harder, the IRS depends on self reporting. The tax code
requires taxpayers to honestly determine their tax bill and voluntarily pay
it. A kind and gentle IRS cannot police this system.
Recent tax reform legislation highlights aggression's necessity. In 1998,
alleged victims of IRS abuse paraded in front of Congressional hear-
ings. 132 These people told horrendous stories, while taxpayer privacy
laws prevented the IRS from telling its side. 133 Recent investigations
have proven most of these stories false, 134 but Congress used these stories
to justify new laws that severely restricted the IRS's ability to collect
tax.135 Congress decided to make the IRS a kinder, gentler debt
collector. 136
As good as Congress's intentions may have been, their IRS Reform
Act caused tax evasion to skyrocket and IRS moral to plummet. For ex-
ample, national property seizures plummeted nearly 80% in 1999.137
North Texas property seizures plummeted from 286 in 1996 to 3 in
1999.138 The number of North Texans that owe uncollected taxes in-
creased from 51,600 in 1997 to 71,100 in 1999.139 The number of North
Texas businesses with federal tax debt increased from 9,900 in 1997 to
16,100 in 1999.140 In addition, the IRS audit rate dropped from 1.7% in
1995 to less than 1% in 2000.141 Tax collections plummeted and Congress
131. Karen Hube, Return to Sender: The IRS is Auditing Fewer People These Days but
Trying to Guess the Red Flags Isn't Easy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at R19 (citing figures
from the Government Accounting Office). That represents almost 1% of the federal gov-
ernment's 1992 budget. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2001, HISTORICAL
TABLES, available at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2001/maindown.html (last visited
Jan. 30, 2003).
132. See John D. McKinnon, Some IRS Abuse Charges are Discredited, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 25, 2000, at A2 [hereinafter McKinnon I]; John D. McKinnon, Highly Publicized Hor-
ror Story that Led to Curb on IRS Quietly Unravels in Virginia Civil Court, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 9, 1999, at A28 [hereinafter McKinnon II].
133. For example, one taxpayer accused the IRS of knocking his son to the floor at gun
point and watching his naked daughter dress at gun point. McKinnon It, supra note 132.
Congress refused to waive the disclosure laws that prohibited the IRS from telling its side
of the story.
134. See McKinnon I, supra note 132; McKinnon II, supra note 132.
135. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 2676,
105th Cong. (1998). Among other things, this act threatens IRS Agents with termination
and greatly restricts the IRS's ability to seize property.
136. See Todd Bensman, IRS Struggling to Recreate Itself as a Gentle Giant: Collections,
Enforcement Slow to a Near Halt in N. Texas District, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 1,
2000, at 1A.
137. John D. McKinnon, Highly Publicized Horror Story that Led to Curb on IRS Qui-
etly Unravels in Virginia Civil Court, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at A28.
138. See Todd Bensman, IRS Struggling to Recreate Itself as a Gentle Giant: Collections,




141. Karen Hube, Return to Sender: The IRS is Auditing Fewer People These Days but
Trying to Guess the Red Flags Isn't Easy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at R19.
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rethought its kinder IRS. 142
B. CONGRESS DOES NOT HAVE THE TIME OR EXPERTISE TO
EFFECTIVELY GOVERN FEDERAL TAXATION
In addition to aggression, an effective IRS must be powerful. Congress
does not posses the expertise or time to effectively determine income tax-
ation's details. These details are incredibly and necessarily complex. This
complexity is driven by the high dollar amounts riding on effective tax
planning. Consider the millions of dollars that companies like Enron and
General Electric have saved through tax planning. 143 A minor label here
or a third party there can produce millions in tax savings. Consequently,
tax professionals dedicate their careers to learning taxation's rules, and
developing procedures for getting around them. Two types of taxation
demonstrate: partnership taxation and consolidated corporate taxation.
Partnership regulations contain complex standards and prohibitions de-
signed to distinguish economic-motivated allocations from tax-motivated
allocations. 144 Only seasoned tax professionals that specialize in partner-
ship taxation can adequately maneuver the regulations' many twists and
turns. On the surface, this complexity may seem unnecessary, but a
deeper look reveals its necessity. Partnership taxation's greatest advan-
tage is the freedom it gives partners to allocate income, loss, and deduc-
tions as they see fit. But this advantage also offers a large opportunity for
abuse. In the past, creative tax professionals have used partnership taxa-
tion's allocation freedom to lower tax liability. They would allocate tax
items one way and economic items another. The partners' economic
gains increased, while the IRS's tax collection decreased.
To stop this abuse without diluting partnership taxation's legitimate ad-
vantages, the IRS developed complex regulations that help distinguish
economic allocations from phantom tax allocations. This distinction re-
quires tracking how tax allocations affect partner equity. A tracking sys-
tem like that combines complex accounting standards with statutory
requirements.1 45 One cannot expect this system to be effectively devel-
oped by a time-strapped Congress that has to legislate everything from
airline safety to consumer credit.
142. See Bensman, supra note 138; Hube, supra note 141.
143. See John D. McKinnon, Enron Strategy Opposed by Clinton Draws Scrutiny of
Government Officials, WALL ST. J., January 15, 2002, at A18 [hereinafter McKinnon III].
Enron used a financial "trust-preferred" securities to reduce taxes and hide debt. Id.
144. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1. This regulation contains over 70 subsections and almost
80 pages of prohibitions and accounting standards that track partnership equity. For an in
depth analysis of partnership taxation, see WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXA-
TION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS (2002).
145. For example, Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b) requires partnerships to maintain
capital accounts in accordance with the general accounting principals in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv). These capital accounts are used to determine proper distributions
upon partnership liquidation. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b) (requiring partnerships to
liquidate in accordance with the positive capital accounts). For a more detailed discussion,
see MCKEE ET AL., supra note 144.
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Another tax complication involves consolidation. Consolidated taxa-
tion allows a financial entity to share tax items while also operating as
separate legal entities. This is a fantastic advantage for corporations, but
it opens avenues for abuse. Without close controls, corporations could
implement schemes that allow them to apply tax credits they did not earn
or deduct tax losses that they did not suffer.' 46 To combat this abuse, the
IRS has established regulations that track everything from asset basis to
corporate tax credit. 147 Again, this is a complex set of accounting and
legal principles that one cannot expect Congress to maintain.
Only one government entity has the expertise and resources to develop
and manage taxation's complexity: the Internal Revenue Service. The In-
ternal Revenue Service employs more tax lawyers than any firm in the
United States. It has tax experts across the nation that can implement the
complicated systems described above. Congress has no choice but to give
the IRS an unusually large amount of power to determine and collect tax.
C. THE IRS's COMBINATION OF POWER AND AGGRESSION
CAN LEAD TO ABUSE
As necessary as an aggressive and powerful IRS is, this combination
can lead to abuse. On one hand, Congress designed the IRS to aggres-
sively collect tax. On the other hand, Congress gives the IRS an unusu-
ally large amount of power to determine tax. This combination
encourages the IRS to aggressively determine tax liabilities. If not care-
fully checked, this aggression can lead to exaggerated tax debts. It can
lead to the IRS imposing tax bills that Congress never intended taxpayers
to pay.
Congress does not have the time or exposure to adequately restrain the
IRS, so courts must fill the gap. The following explains why the Federal
Circuit fills this gap so well.
V. NO COURT CHECKS THE BEAST BETTER THAN THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
No tax venue restrains the IRS's aggression and power better than the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Other tax venues lack the Federal Cir-
146. For example, Enron used "trust-preferred" securities to reduce taxes and hide
debt. McKinnon III, supra note 143. Enron would borrow money from a subsidiary, treat
the transaction as debt for tax purposes, but as equity for financial accounting purposes. Id.
Enron's latest financial statements show at least $900 million dollars of these trust-pre-
ferred securities. Id. The Internal Revenue Service initially challenged these securities, so
Enron filed suit in the Tax Court. Id. Many observers thought that the IRS would lose
that case, so the IRS eventually settled, and issued Technical Advice that allowed some
kinds of trust-preferred securities. Id. See also BriKER & EUSTICE, supra note 51, § 5.10
(describing corporate tax shelters in general) and § 13.42[5][c] (2001) (describing "son of
mirror" transactions that allowed taxpayer to deduct phantom losses).
147. For example, I.R.C. § 382 restricts a parent's ability to purchase a subsidiary and
immediately apply that subsidiary's loss carryovers to the consolidated tax return. The
subsidiary loss carryover is treated like an investment that the parent must apply over time.
For a detailed explanation, see BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 51, § 14.44.
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cuit's history and monetary-claim expertise. The Federal Circuit special-
izes in bringing uniform justice to disputes between the United States and
its citizens. The next parts explain. Part A describes the Federal Circuit's
history, and Part B explains why other tax venues do not bring justice as
effectively as the Federal Circuit.
A. CONGRESS CREATED THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS AND THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS TO FAIRLY SETTLE
MONETARY DISPUTES BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND ITS CITIZENS
The Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims evolved from the
original Court of Claims. 148 Congress specifically created these courts to
bring prompt justice to citizens with monetary claims against the United
States.
Congress created the Court of Claims on February 25, 1855.149 This
court originally had jurisdiction to hear monetary claims based on a con-
gressional statute, executive regulation, or contract with the United
States.150 Before then, citizens submitted these claims directly to Con-
gress.151 But as Congress's workload increased, it decided to create a
separate tribunal named the Court of Claims. Pleased by the Court of
Claims's performance, Congress further expanded its jurisdiction in 1887;
the Court of Claims became the primary forum for all monetary claims
against the government. 152
As the Court of Claims's work load increased, it split into a trial and
appeals division. The Court of Claims relied on commissioners to hear
evidence and determine facts. 153 The court's judges then acted as an ap-
peals division for parties that did not agree with the commissioners' find-
ings. Congress formalized this arrangement in 1982 by splitting the Court
of Claims into a formal Article III trial court and Article III appeals
court. 154 The trial court is named the United States Court of Federal
Claims and the Appeals Court is named the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals.
These courts both continue the tradition stated in Abraham Lincoln's
1861 message to Congress: "It is as much the duty of government to
render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to adminis-
148. At that time the Court of Federal Claims was known as the Court of Claims. Con-
gress changed its name to the United States Court of Federal Claims on October 29, 1992.
Federal Courts Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506.






154. Id. The original Court of Claims judges became Federal Circuit appeals judges,
and additional judges were appointed for the new Court of Federal Claims. Id.
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ter the same between private individuals."' 155
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S HISTORY AND EXPERTISE HELP IT
CHECK THE IRS BETTER THAN ANY OTHER TAX VENUE
The Federal Circuit's tradition and expertise has helped it restrain the
IRS more effectively than any other Court. The Tax Court lacks the Fed-
eral Circuit's history and perspective, and the regional circuit courts of
appeal lack the Federal Circuit's expertise.
The United States Tax Court began as executive agency, and it has al-
ways specialized in tax. The Revenue Act of 1924 established the Tax
Court's predecessor named the Board of Tax Appeals.' 56 This Board was
an independent executive agency created to provide taxpayers a forum
for disputing tax deficiencies before payment. 57 Before then, taxpayers
had to pay a disputed tax deficiency before they could seek judicial relief.
In 1969, Congress changed this tribunal's name to the United States Tax
Court, and changed it from an executive agency to an Article I court. 158
The President appoints Tax Court judges to 15-year terms.
The Tax Court's IRS focused history prevents it from appreciating the
IRS's unusual power and aggressiveness. The Tax Court has never settled
disputes involving other federal agencies, so it does not completely appre-
ciate how the IRS compares to other agencies. The Court of Federal
Claims and the Federal Circuit, on the other hand, regularly settle dis-
putes with many different federal agencies. Thus, the Tax Court is more
limited in its ability to determine how much courts should defer to the
IRS.
The federal district courts and the regional courts of appeals have a
wider exposure to federal agencies than the Tax Court, but these courts
lack the Federal Circuit's expertise and uniformity. The Federal Circuit
specializes in refund suits against federal agencies. It specializes in the
issues that a court must consider when determining how much deference
to give the IRS. Also, the Federal Circuit has national jurisdiction, in-
stead of regional jurisdiction. Its understanding of deference issues is not
limited to one geographic area, and it can apply deference standards
uniformly.
VI. SUMMARY: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS IS GOOD FOR THE FEDERAL SYSTEM OF
TAX LITIGATION
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has a long history of fairly set-
tling monetary disputes between the United States and its citizens. Its tax
jurisprudence is no exception. The Federal Circuit has a keen eye for the
155. See United States Court of Federal Claims website, at http://
www.uscfc.uscourts.gov (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
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IRS's power and aggressiveness, and it has checked the IRS whenever
justice has required. Since the Federal Circuit performs this duty better
than all other tax venues, Congress should retain the crazy quilt of tax
litigation and continue to let the Federal Circuit promote justice.
Casenote
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